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ABSTRACT  
In balancing religious freedom with the right to equality and human dignity of persons 
affected by discriminatory measures, the provisions of sections 9, 10, 15(1), 31(1) and 
36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 and sections 7, 8 
and 14 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000 have to be considered.  Especially in the case of racial or gender discrimination, 
the burden rests on the respondent to prove that the distinction is based on 
acknowledged church dogma or religious belief, and is of such a nature that it passes 
the test of a nuanced and context-sensitive form of balancing of these freedoms and the 
right to human dignity and equality of persons affected by them.   
1. BACKGROUND  
Religious freedom (s 15(1)) and freedom of religious communities (s 31(1)), like most of 
the fundamental rights entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
108 of 1996, are not applied in isolation. In this introduction I want to concentrate on the 
interaction between religious freedom and the constitutional values of equality and 
human dignity. This interaction illustrates the complexity of the church-state relationship, 
and especially the pitfalls of a strict separation between church and state on the one 
hand, or a cosy relationship between the state and state supported institutions on the 
other hand.
1
  
 
 
 
1    De Waal, J, Currie, I & Erasmus, G 2000. The Bill of Rights Handbook, 263.  
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2. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  
Freedom of belief or religion in terms of section 15(1) of the Constitution is a 
manifestation of the constitutional principle that everyone has the right to decide in what 
way he/she wants to express his/her belief and take part in religious practices. This 
aspect is connected to the fact that individuals have the right to decide where they want 
to commit themselves in the free exercise of their religious convictions as protected by 
section 31(1). It leads to a free society in which every individual can develop and realise 
him-/herself.
2
 Section 9 prohibits any discrimination against a person on the ground of 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, belief, conviction, culture or language (section 9(4)), with the 
exception of cases where such discrimination can be justified (section 9(5)).   
Freedom and equality as principles to be taken into account in this regard seem to be 
contradictory principles.
3
 It is, however, necessary that a balancing of interests should 
take place, which will indicate in every specific case to what extent the equality principle 
is compatible with the freedom of religion of individuals.
4
  In balancing these interests 
the degree to which an association or institution is of a private or public nature and/or 
functions accordingly is important, but not decisive.
5
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2    S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) par 92; Woolman & De Waal 1994, 340. See in this  
regard the distinction between the individual and collective elements of religion by Rautenbach, I M & Malherbe, 
E F J 1999. Staatsreg, 375 and Malherbe, E F J  1998. Die grondwetlike beskerming van godsdiensvryheid 
TSAR, 680.   
3    Davis, D 1994. Equality and equal protection in Van Wyk D et al (eds) Rights and constitutionalism, 196; 
Woolman & De Waal 1994, 340-341.      
4    Davis 1994, 196:  "Equality thus is inextricably linked to the conception of liberty if society is to allow the 
promotion of competeting interests.  Where equality is different, however, to liberty is that it depends upon a 
comparator. It is here that equality becomes an enigmatic concept.” See also S v Manamela and Another 2000 
3 SA 1 (CC).  
5    Rautenbach, I M  1995. General provisions of the South African Bill of Rights, 77-78;  Strydom, HA 1995. The 
private domain and the bill of rights SAPL, 52-68.   
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In S v Manamela and Another
6
 the balancing effect of section 36 was described as an 
overall assesment that will vary from case to case:  
In essence, the Court must engage in a balancing exercise and arrive at a global 
judgment on proportionality and not adhere mechanically to a sequential check-list. As 
a general rule, the more serious the impact of the measure on the right, the more 
persuasive or compelling the justification must be. Ultimately, the question is one of 
degree to be assessed in the concrete legislative and social setting of the measure, 
paying due regard to the means which are realistically available in our country at this 
stage, but without losing sight of the ultimate values to be protected….Each particular 
infringement of a right has different implications in an open and democratic society 
based on dignity, equality and freedom. There can accordingly be no absolute standard 
for determining reasonableness.          
 
3. EQUALITY LEGISLATION  
The equality principle in terms of section 9 of the Constitution was further strengthened 
by the promulgation of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act 4 of 2000. In the preamble it is stated that the consolidation of democracy in South 
Africa requires the eradication of social and economic inequalities. Systemic inequalities 
and unfair discrimination remain deeply embedded in social structures, practices and 
attitudes. The Act endeavours to facilitate the transition to a democratic society, united 
in its diversity, marked by human relations that are caring and compassionate, and 
guided by the principles of equality, fairness, equity, social progress, justice, human 
dignity and freedom.  
Chapter 4 prescribes the procedure of instituting a claim in terms of the Act. An 
important issue is the determination of the burden of proof and whether the 
discrimination was fair or unfair. In terms of section 13(1) the complainant may make 
out a prima facie case of discrimination, whereupon the respondent must prove, on the 
facts before the court, that the discrimination did not take place as alleged or the 
conduct is not based on one or more of the prohibited grounds. If the respondent does 
not succeed in rebutting that the discrimination took place on any of the specific 
prohibited grounds
7
, such discrimination is unfair, unless the respondent proves that the 
discrimination is fair (section 13(2)(a)).  
6    2000 3 SA (CC) 1 at par 32 and 33.   
7    See the grounds listed in (a) of the description of ‘prohibited grounds’ in s 1 of the Act, which correspond with 
the grounds of s 9(3) of the Constitution.   
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This procedure differs from the normal procedure set by Harksen v Lane NO
8
 where the 
applicant has to prove that discrimination on any of the grounds prohibited in section 9 
of the Constitution took place, whereupon the presumption of unfair discrimination may 
be rebutted by the respondent. Where the discrimination is based on any other ground 
that causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage, undermines human dignity or 
adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious 
manner,
9
 section 13(2)(b) stipulates that such discrimination is unfair, unless the 
respondent proves that it is fair.  
 
Sections 14 states certain factors that have to be used in the determination of the 
fairness or unfairness of discriminatory actions or procedure. These factors are an 
expansion of the factors stated in section 36(1) of the Constitution:  
(i) It is not unfair to take measures designed to protect or advance persons previously 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.  
(ii) In determining whether discrimination is fair, the context and the question whether the 
discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons according to 
objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the activity concerned, should be 
considered.  
(iii) Whether the discrimination impairs human dignity.   
(iv) The impact of the discrimination on the complainant.  
(v) The position of the complainant in society and whether he/she suffers from patterns of 
disadvantage.  
(vi) The nature and extent of the discrimination.   
(vii)  Whether the discrimination is systemic in nature.   
(viii) Whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose.  
(ix) Whether the discrimination achieves its purpose and whether there are less restrictive 
and diasadvantageous means to achieve the purpose.  
(x) Whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such steps as being reasonable in 
the circumstances to address the disadvantage and accommodate diversity.  
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8    1998 1 SA 300 (CC) 324H-325D; Kok 2001, 304.  
9    See (b) of the description of prohibited grounds in s 1 of the Act. These grounds are not stated in s 9 of the 
Constitution.   
 
4. EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION IN CASE LAW 
From the above-mentioned discussion it is clear that freedom of religion is not protected 
and applied in isolation, but all the rights, freedoms and values of the Bill of Rights are 
applied in a balanced way in the context and according to the circumstances of a 
specific case. Therefore the right to equality and non-discrimination always forms part of 
the balancing process.  
4.1 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education
10
  
An interesting application of the constitutional principles regarding freedom of religion, 
belief and opinion in terms of section 15(1) of the Constitution is the decision of the 
constitutional court in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education. The 
purpose of the application brought by Christian Education South Africa, a voluntary 
association representing 196 independent Christian schools with a total of 
approximately 14 500 pupils, was to obtain an order declaring section 10 of the South 
African Schools Act 84 of 1996, which prohibits corporal punishment in schools, invalid 
and unconstitutional in that it interferes with their right to freedom of religion and cultural 
life. The Association contended that corporal punishment is a vital aspect of Christian 
religion and that it is applied in the light of its Biblical context using Biblical guidelines 
that impose a responsibility on parents for the training of their children. Any limitation on 
this freedom is based on religious discrimination and, therefore, on the constitutional 
value of equality. The defence of the Minister of Ecucation was that it is not the 
prohibition, but the infliction of corporal punishment, that infringes the constitutional 
rights of equality (section 9) and human dignity (section 10). The court accepted that the 
freedom of religion (section 15(1)) and the freedom to practise religion in terms of 
section 31(1)(a) are to a certain extent interlinked.  
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10  2000 4 SA 757 (CC). See the discussion of the a quo case 1999 1 BCLR 951 (SE) by Du Plessis, M 2000. Doing 
damage to freedom of religion SLR 295-305.  
 
 
Although section 15(1) protects individual beliefs and religious practices, it cannot be 
separated from the proviso of section 31(2) altogether:
11
  
Section 31(2) ensures that the concept of rights of members of communities 
that associate on the basis of language, culture and religion, cannot be used to 
shield practices which offend the Bill of Rights. These explicit qualifications may 
be seen as serving a double purpose. The first is to prevent protected 
associational rights of members of communities from being used to ‘privatise’ 
constitutionally offensive group practices and thereby immunise them from 
external legislative regulation or judicial control. This would be particularly 
important in relation to practices previously associated with the abuse of the 
notion of pluralism to achieve exclusivity, privilege and domination.  The 
second relates to oppressive features of internal relationships primarily 
within the communities concerned, where section 8, which regulates the 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, might be specially relevant. This 
is clearly an area where interpretation should be prudently undertaken so 
that appropriate constitutional analysis can be developed over time in the 
light of the multitude of different situations that will arise.        
The last-mentioned caution is extremely important. It is still unclear to what extent the 
state (by way of legislation or constitutional case law) will give precedence to the 
equality clause in especially racial and gender discrimination issues.
12
 Will the strict 
scrutiny-test or the context sensitive balancing-test be applied by courts?   
The fact that churches and religious institutions function mainly in the private sphere 
may be a limiting factor on state intervention. Woolman and De Waal
13
 state as follows:  
Cultural (and religious) associations will generally find themselves in a similarly 
advantageous position. To the extent that these associations stick to bona fide religious 
and cultural activities they will be relatively immune to state intervention.   
While there may be the odd good reason to open up the membership policies of 
cultural and religious associations, there are no good reason for state interference in 
the internal affairs of such associations. The internal affairs of such associations are 
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generally linked to some concrete vision of religious or community life. In a liberal 
society the state should have no role to play in the construction of these particular 
visions of the good life.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
11   774A-C. S 31(2) states: “The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any 
provision of the Bill of Rights.”   
12   See Brink v Kitshoff 1996  6 BCLR 752 (CC);  Carpenter, G.  2001. Equality and non-discrimination in the new 
South African constitutional order. THRHR 64(3) 409 419.  
13   1994, 384.  
 
Although the viewpoint of these authors can be approved of in broad outline, the state 
ought to be able to intervene in the internal relationships or activities of the organisation 
if discriminating measures of a church are not applied on the basis of religious 
considerations.  Furthermore, in the application of the equality and non-discrimination 
principles, especially regarding race and gender, the fairness of the discrimination 
should be measured according to the factors stated in section 14(3) of the Promotion of 
Equality Act, and especially to what extent human dignity is thereby impaired and what 
the impact of the discrimination is on the complainant. On the question whether a strict 
scrutiny test of state intervention should be applied in the case of equality and 
discrimination matters, the court held in the Christian Education case that in the case of 
the limitation of religious freedom a nuanced and context-sensitive form of balancing will 
be more suitable for the application of section 36 of the Constitution (and by implication 
section 14(3) of the Promotion of Equality Act) than the American strict scrutiny test.
14
  
 
The unanimous decision of the constitutional court in the Christian Education case was 
primarily based on effectuating equality through the balancing effect of the constitutional 
value of the protection of human dignity. It was acknowledged that a multiplicity of 
intersecting constitutional values and interests were involved, some overlapping and 
some competing:
15
   
The overlap and tension between the difficult clusters of rights reflects themselves in 
contradictory assessments of how the central constitutional value of dignity is 
implacated. On the one hand, the dignity of the parents may be negatively affected 
Prof GJ Pienaar  PER/PELJ 2003(6)2 
128/173 
 
when the State tells them how to bring up and discipline their children and limits the 
manner in which they may express their religious beliefs. The child who has grown up in 
the particular faith may regard the punishment, although hurtful, as designed to 
strengthen his character.  
 
14   Christian Education par 29 and 30. See also Rautenbach 2001, 331-332. But see Brink v Kitshoff par 40-42 and 
Carpenter 2001, 419 on the necessity of strict scrutiny in the case of racial and gender discrimination. However, 
it is important to note that racial or gender discrimination did not form part of the issues under consideration in 
the Christian Education-case.     
15   Par 15 768E-769C.  
 
 
On the other hand, the child is being subjected to what an outsider might regard as the 
indignity of suffering a painful and humiliating hiding deliberately inflicted on him in an 
institutional setting. Indeed, it would be unusual if the child did not have ambivalent 
emotions. It is in this complex factual and psychological setting that the matter must be 
decided.  
In applying the proportionality principle to the different aspects of the constitutional 
value of human dignity, justice Sachs held that the ban on corporal punishment formed 
part of a legislative scheme designed to establish uniform educational standards. 
Although such measure may be considered as discriminatory on religious grounds, the 
ban was part of a comprehensive process of eliminating state-sanctioned use of 
physical force as a method of punishment:
16
  
The outlawing of physical punishment in the school accordingly represented more than 
a pragmatic attempt to deal with disciplinary problems in a new way. It had a principled 
and symbolic function, manifestly intended to prmote respect for the dignity and 
physical and emotional integrity of all children.  
 
A. Prince v President, Cape Law Society
17
   
 
The question before the constitutional court was whether the respondent might refuse 
the membership application of an acknowledged Rastafarian who was convicted in 
terms of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 of smoking cannabis as part of 
his religious observances. In judging the applicant’s evidence  regarding the religious 
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practices of the Rastafari, the court referred to the Christian Education case
18
 in 
stressing the importance of the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion in an open 
and democratic society. The constitutional court again confirmed that a person’s 
freedom, and in this case a person’s religious freedom, is one of the key ingredients of 
his/her dignity.
19
 Yet freedom of religion goes beyond protecting the inviolability of the 
individual conscience, but also includes a person’s religious activities.
20
 However, this 
right to personal belief and religious practices in terms of section 15(1) and the right to 
practice these beliefs in a community in terms of section 31(1), are in the first instance 
subjected to the limitation embodied in section 31(2) and in the second instance to the 
limitation clause of section 36 (as expanded by the factors stated in section 14(3) of the 
Promotion of Equality Act). In the proportionality analysis required by section 36 on the 
Constitution, the majority of the court (justices Chaskalson, Ackermann, Kriegler, 
Goldstone and Yacoob), rejected the notion that the practice of religion, as distinct from 
belief, is absolute. The majority contended that, in dealing with the limitation of rights, 
“…the Constitution does not call for different levels of scrutiny, but expressly 
contemplates the use of a nuanced and context-sensitive form of balancing in the s 36 
proportionality analysis.”
21
 Therefore they found that the state’s interest in limiting the 
use of harmful drugs (in this case the possession of cannabis) in the interest of the 
public at large and to honour international obligations exceeds the religious freedom of 
Rastafari to use cannabis in the exercise of religious practices.
22
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16   786B-C.  
17   2002 2 SA 794 (CC).   
18   815F-816A. In the Christian Education case it was held that section 15(1) safeguards private religious beliefs 
and practices, which will not necessarily be upheld in the application of the limitation clause (s 36) to the 
practices of religious communities in terms of section 31(1), and was indeed not upheld in the case of Christian 
schools.   
19   816C-D: “The protection of diversity is the hallmark of a free and open society. It is the recognition of the 
inherent dignity of all human beings. Freedom is an indispensable ingredient of human dignity. Human dignity is 
an important constitutional value that not only informs the interpretation of most, if not all, other constitutional 
rights, but is also central in the limiatations analysis.”     
20   Christian Education case 772G-773D: “There are a number of other provisions designed to protect the rights of 
members of communities. They underline the constitutional value of acknowledging diversity and pluralism in 
our society and give a particular texture to the broadly phrased right to freedom of association contained in s 18. 
Taken together, they affirm the right of people to be who they are without being forced to subordinate 
themselves to the cultural and religious norms of others, and highlight the importance of individuals and 
communities being able to enjoy what has been called the ‘right to be different’. In each case, space has been 
found for members of communities to depart from a legal norm. These provisions collectively and separately 
acknowledge the rich tapestry constituted by civil society, indicating in particular that language, culture and 
religion constitute a strong weave in the overall pattern.   It might well be that in the envisaged  pluralistic 
society members of large groups can more easily rely on the legislative process than can those belonging to 
smaller ones, so that the latter might be specially reliant on constitutional protection, particularly if they express 
their beliefs in a way that the majority regard  as unusual, bizarre or even threatening. Nevertheless,  the 
interest protected by s 31 is not a statical one dependent on a counter-balancing of numbers, but a qualitative 
one based on respect for diversity.”       
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CONCLUSION  
Although the interaction between freedom of religion and the equality principle protects 
a person from unnecessary state intervention in his/her religious activities, these rights 
are not absolute or unlimited. In the case of discrimination based on a prohibition on the 
exercise of religious practices, the burden rests on the respondent to proof that a 
distinction is based on acknowledged church dogma or religious beliefs, and is of such 
a nature that it passes the test of a nuanced and context-sensitive form of balancing of 
these rights and the right to equality of affected persons. It was even proposed that a 
strict scrutiny test has to be applied in the case of racial and gender discrimination. 
Although a person’s right to religious freedom is one of the key ingredients of his/her 
human dignity (cf the Christian Education case), it is not absolute and may in certain 
circumstances be exceeded by the interest of the community or international obligations 
(cf the Prince case).         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21   Christian Education case par 30; Prince case par 128.   
22   Par 139.   
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